Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 57

Number 2

1-1-2004

Pension Law: Cash Balance Pension Plans Are Not Inherently Age
Discriminatory: Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan Defies a
Strong History of Support for the Cash Balance Design
Allison C. McGrath

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Retirement Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allison C. McGrath, Pension Law: Cash Balance Pension Plans Are Not Inherently Age Discriminatory:
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan Defies a Strong History of Support for the Cash Balance Design, 57
OKLA. L. REV. 429 (2004),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

Pension Law: Cash Balance Pension Plans Are Not
Inherently Age Discriminatory: Cooper v. IBM Personal

Pension Plan Defies a Strong History of Support for the
Cash Balance Design*
I. Introduction
In 1985, Bank of America implemented the first cash balance pension
plan.' Over the next eighteen years, numerous companies converted their
traditional defined benefit plans into cash balance pension plans and other
hybrid defined benefit plans.2 Employers have converted their traditional
defined benefit plans into cash balance pension plans for a variety of sound
reasons; the terms of cash balance pension plans are easier to understand
than traditional defined benefit plans, and by providing benefits that accrue
more evenly over employees' careers, such plans allow employees greater
mobility and flexibility in employment by making it easier to change jobs
mid-career.3 Nevertheless, cash balance pension plans have also received
substantial criticism because the conversion from traditional defined benefit
plans to cash balance pension plans often decreases older employees'
expected future benefits.'
* Winner, 2003-2004 Sharp Award for Outstanding Case Note.
1. Elizabeth E. Drigotas, Cash Balance Plans: An Overview, 28 TAX MGMT.
COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 39, 40 (2000).
2. Douglas E. Motzenbecker, Recent Case Law Developments Affecting Cash Balance
PensionPlans, 17 LAB. LAW. 285,285 (2001-02). For an explanation of hybrid defined benefit
plans, see infra Part II.C.
3. Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 289; Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,[2002 Transfer
Binder] N.Y.U. Rev. of Employee Ben. & Exec. Compensation (MB) 13-1, 13-53 (July 2002)
[hereinafter Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans].
4. See Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash BalancePension Plan Conversions,
25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 379, 393 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance
Controversy, 19 VA. TA REv. 683, 685, 697 (2000) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Cash Balance];
Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supra note 3, at 13-58 to 13-59. Provided that employers
protect their employees' already earned benefits, they may convert their traditional defined
benefit plans into cash balance pension plans. Forman & Nixon, supra, at 384; Simplifying
Defined Benefit Plans,supra note 3, at 13-59. The applicable law permits employers to reduce
future accruals or even terminate a pension plan provided that employees' accrued benefits are
not reduced. Forman & Nixon, supra, at 384; Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supra note
3, at 13-59. When a traditional defined benefit plan is converted to a cash balance pension plan,
however, older employees may lose a significant portion of their expected future benefit.
Forman & Nixon, supra, at 393; Zelinsky, Cash Balance, supra, at 685, 697; Four Uneasy
Pieces: Fourth Piece:A Cash Balance Primerfor the Largely Uninvolved Practitionerwith
Only an OccasionalNeed to Know FancyPension Law, [2001 Transfer Binder] N.Y.U. 59th
Inst. on Fed. Tax'n (MB) at 9-6 (2001) [hereinafter FourthPiece];Simplifying Defined Benefit
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Although the conversion from traditional defined benefit plans to cash
balance pension plans creates the most noticeable adverse effect on older
employees,5 critics argue that the cash balance design itself is inherently age
discriminatory. 6 Until Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan,7 however,
neither the courts that had considered this argument nor the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), which is primarily responsible for implementing the
age discrimination regulations, 8 had found the cash balance pension plan
design to be age discriminatory.9 Despite prior precedent that provides
support for the cash balance design, in Cooper, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois interpreted the age discrimination provisions
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) in a
manner that would result in cash balance pension plans being declared
inherently age discriminatory. If this interpretation prevails, employers will
most likely abandon their cash balance pension plans, a result not favored
by public policy considerations. 0
This note explains the manner in which the Cooper court misinterpreted
the age discrimination provisions of ERISA, and that according to the
correct interpretation, cash balance pension plans are not inherently age
discriminatory. Part II of this note provides a brief comparison of various
pension plan designs. Part III explores the various statutes and prior case
law that are applicable to cash balance pension plans, as well as pension
equity plans. Part IV provides a detailed analysis of the case of Cooper v.
IBM PersonalPension Plan. Finally, Part V details how the Cooper court
misinterpreted the applicable age discrimination requirements of ERISA and
concludes that IBM's pension plan designs are not inherently age
discriminatory according to the correct legal analysis.

Plans, supra note 3, at 13-59. Unlike employees' accrued benefits, the law does not protect
employees' expected future benefits. Fourth Piece, supra, at 9-6; Simplifying Defined Benefit
Plans, supra note 3, at 13-59.
5. Eaton v. Onan, 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Motzenbecker, supra note
2, at 290; Fourth Piece, supra note 4, at 9-6.
6. See Zelinsky, Cash Balance, supra note 4, at 761; FourthPiece, supra note 4, at 9-10.
7. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
8. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978,43 Fed. Reg. 47,713,47,713 (Aug. 10, 1978); see
H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 4025.
9. See infra Parts Il.B, I.C, EI.D.
10. See infra Part V.C.
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II. An Overview of Employee Benefit Plans
Currently, the United States has a "voluntary pension system."" Thus,
employers are not required to establish a retirement plan for their
employees.' 2 If, however, employers establish a pension plan for the benefit
of their employees, the plan must comply with the applicable provisions of
14
both the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 3 and ERISA, which provide a
regulatory framework for two types of retirement plans: defined benefit
plans and defined contribution plans.' 5
A. Defined Benefit Plans
A traditional defined benefit plan guarantees employees a specific benefit
at retirement determined pursuant to a formula specified in the particular
company's plan. 16 Such benefit is typically paid at retirement in the form of
an annuity over the employee's life.' 7 A common formula used for this type
of plan defines the pension benefit as a certain percentage of employees'
final average compensation multiplied by the number of years that they
Normally, employees' final average
worked for the company. 8
their highest three- or five-year earnings
of
average
the
equals
compensation
9 Consequently, traditional defined benefit plans
at the end of their career.'
typically provide more valuable benefits during the final years of
employees' careers. 2° Thus, older employees with longer years of service

11. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 383.
12. Id.

13. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-457 (2000).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-457; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461; see also Drigotas, supra note 1, at 39.
16. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 39.
17. Id.
18. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 386. For example, a typical defined benefit plan may
calculate retirement benefits using a formula equal to 2% multiplied by years of service
multiplied by final average compensation. See id. at 385-86. If an employee worked for thirty
years with a final average compensation of $60,000, his retirement benefit would equal $36,000
(.02 x 30 x $60,000). See id.
19. Id. at 386; see Drigotas, supra note 1, at 39.
20. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that under a traditional defined benefit plan,
"accruals during the early years of service are relatively small, with a substantial portion of
accruals coming towards the end of a participant's career"); Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at
388-89 (explaining that the design of a traditional defined benefit plan provides employees with
a financial incentive to work for the same employer throughout their entire careers and penalizes
mobile workers).
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benefit most from the traditional defined benefit design, while younger,
more mobile workers are disadvantaged by the plan's emphasis on
employees' highest average compensation and number of years of service.2
Given that employers must guarantee a specific benefit to employees at
termination of employment under a defined benefit plan, the amount of the
benefit is unaffected by the investment performance of the plan assets.22
Employers bear the risk of investment and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) insures a portion of the accrued benefits in the event
that employers are unable to fund the guaranteed benefits.
B. Defined Contribution Plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, employers deposit annual
benefits into individual investment accounts maintained for each employee
who participates in the plan.24 In general, the annual contribution to each
account is a specified percentage of the particular employee's salary. 5
Unlike a defined benefit plan, employers do not guarantee the amount of the
benefit.26 Rather, employees bear the risk of investment and are not entitled
to a specific benefit amount at retirement. 27 Employees' benefits are based
on the balance of their individual investment accounts, and employees are
usually entitled to their vested account balance at termination of
employment. 28 Accordingly, the benefit amount received by participants
equals the value of employer contributions to their individual investment
accounts plus or minus any investment gains or losses on such
contributions.29
In addition, defined contribution plans are more readily transferable than
defined benefit plans.3 ° Younger, more mobile workers benefit from the
portability of a defined contribution plan, which makes it more convenient

21. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 388-89; Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41.
22. Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 286.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (2000); see Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 385-86;
Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 286.
24. Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 287.
25. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 386. For example, the retirement formula may
calculate benefits as 5% of salary. Id. "Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30,000 in a
given year would have $1500 (5% x $30,000) contributed to [his] individual investment
account .. ."Id.
26. Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 287.
27. Zelinsky, Cash Balance, supra note 4, at 692.
28. Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 287.
29. Id.
30. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss2/8

2004]

NOTES

for such workers to change jobs mid-career and take their accrued benefit
with them.31
C. Hybrid Pension Plans
Certain retirement plans, known as hybrid pension plans, combine the
characteristics of defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.32 In
many cases, employers adopt hybrid pension plans to "garner the relative
advantages of each of the separate approaches to plan design in a single
plan. 33 Given that the IRC and ERISA only provide a regulatory framework
for two types of retirement plans, each hybrid pension plan must be
regulated as either a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan,
depending on the specific characteristics of the hybrid plan.34

31. Id. Defined contribution plans allow employees to accrue benefits more evenly over
their careers than defined benefit plans, which provide more valuable benefits during the final
years of employees' careers. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41. Thus, employees are not penalized
if they decide to change jobs mid-career. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 391. At
termination of their previous job, employees are entitled to the balance of their account. Id.
32. Alvin D. Lurie, Age DiscriminationorAge Justification?: The Case of the Shrinking
FutureInterest Credits Under Cash Balance Plans,54 TAX LAW. 299, 309 (2001) [hereinafter
Lurie, Age Discrimination].
33. Robert L. Clark et al., Adopting Hybrid PensionPlans:Financialand Communication
Issues, 17 BENEFITS Q. 7, 7 (2001); see also Four Uneasy Pieces: Third Piece: Pension Equity
PlansAre Not the Evil Things Some Would Have You Believe, [2001 Transfer Binder] N.Y.U.
59th Inst. on Fed. Tax'n, 8-1, 8-7 (2001) [hereinafter Third Piece] (explaining that the
increasing use of hybrid pension plans is "driven by the marketplace" and the demands of
employees).
34. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supranote 32, at 309. Congress recognized the combined
characteristics of hybrid pension plans through its regulation of target benefit plans. A target
benefit plan appears similar to a defined benefit plan but is regulated as a defined contribution
plan. Id. Using a defined benefit formula, employers contribute a certain amount to each
participant's individual account. Id. The target amount, however, is not guaranteed at
retirement because employees bear the risk of investment. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at
387; see Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 309. For this reason, a target benefit plan
is considered a defined contribution plan and must comply with the applicable statutory
provisions regulating defined contribution plans. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at
309. Section 41 1(b)(2) of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(2) (2000), provides age discrimination
regulations for defined contribution plans. Section 411(b)(2)(B) of the IRC is titled
"Application to target benefit plans," and section 411 (b)(2)(C) of the IRC states, "The Secretary
shall provide by regulation for the application of the requirements of this paragraph to target
benefit plans." 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(2)(B), (C).
Cash balance pension plans had just been developed at the time the OBRA age
discrimination provisions were added in 1986. See Drigotas, supra note 1, at 39; see also Lurie,
Age Discrimination,supranote 32, at 310; infra Part LH.A. Such timing explains the omission
of a similar provision regarding cash balance pension plans in the OBRA age discrimination
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1. Cash Balance Pension Plans
A cash balance pension plan is a hybrid pension plan3 5 that appears
similar to a defined contribution plan but is treated as a defined benefit
plan.36 Therefore, a cash balance pension plan must comply with those
portions of the IRC and ERISA that regulate defined benefit plans.37 A cash
balance pension plan resembles a defined contribution plan because
participants' berefits are based on their hypothetical account balances.38
These purely hypothetical accounts, however, are "merely bookkeeping
devices for cash balance plans."' 9
A cash balance pension plan is considered a defined benefit plan because
it defines the benefit as a specific amount paid by the plan at retirement,
rather than as a specific amount contributed each year to an actual individual
account. 4° Each year, the hypothetical account typically accumulates both
a pay credit, which is a percentage of the employee's salary, and an interest
credit, which is a certain percentage of the employee's hypothetical account
balance. 4 ' In contrast to traditional defined benefit plans, which usually
provide benefits in the form of a monthly annuity, cash balance pension
plans usually provide employees with the option of receiving their
retirement income either as a lump sum or as an annuity.4 2 Because

provisions. See Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 310 n.22; see also infra Part III.A.
However, it also indicates Congress's recognition of the combined characteristics of hybrid
benefit plans. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 309-10.
35. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 387.
36. Id. at 394.
37. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 39; Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 288.
38. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 394-95. A cash balance pension formula calculates
benefits similar to a bank account because the allocations to the hypothetical account accrue
interest in much the same way as a savings account. See id. at 380.
39. Id. at 397.
40. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO/HEHS-00-207, CASH BALANCE PLANS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT 10 (2000).
41. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 381. For example, consider an employee with a
hypothetical account balance of $5000, who makes a $30,000 salary in a given year. See id.
If the cash balance pension plan allots a 7% pay credit and a 5% interest credit, then a $2100
(.07 x $30,000) pay credit and a $250 (.05 x $5000) interest credit will be added to the
employee's hypothetical account for that year. See id. This will yield a total account balance
of $7350. See id.
42. Futureof Cash BalancePlans UncertainAfter Recent Ruling Against IBM, [July-Dec.
Transfer Binder] 30 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No. 34, at 1926 (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter
Future of Cash BalancePlans]. In fact, lump sum payments are very common under a cash
balance pension plan. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41.
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employers bear the risk of investment, participants are guaranteed the
hypothetical account balance regardless of the investment performance of
the pension funds. 43 Thus, proponents argue that cash balance plans provide
employees with the best of both worlds: the easy-to-understand benefit
formula of a defined contribution plan and the investment security of a
defined benefit plan."
2. Pension Equity Plans
A pension equity plan is a variant of the cash balance pension plan4 5 and
has been described by one commentator as "a kissing cousin of cash balance
plans."' Similar to cash balance pension plans, pension equity plans
guarantee a certain benefit to employees and allocate that benefit to their
hypothetical accounts.47 Instead of defining the hypothetical account
balance in terms of pay credits and interest credits, a pension equity plan
often defines the benefit in terms of annual percentages, also known as
credits,4 8 which are multiplied by employees' final average earnings.49
Annual credits can be based on employees' ages, years of service with the
Annual credits are added to
employer, or a combination of both.5'

43. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41; Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 397; Simplifying
Defined Benefit Plans, supra note 3, at 13-56. In actuality, plan assets are not allocated to
participants' accounts, which are purely hypothetical. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 40. Rather,
such assets are pooled and invested at the direction of the employer, which bears the risk and
reward of the investment. Future of Cash Balance Plans, supra note 42, at 1926.
44. See Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41; Motzenbecker, supra note 2, at 288. Because cash
balance pension plans are considered defined benefit pension plans, they are insured by the
PBGC. Future of Cash Balance Plans,supra note 42, at 1926.
45. Third Piece,supra note 33, at 8-6.
46. Courts Take the Juice out of Cash Balance Plans, [2003] 100 TAX NOTES (Tax
Analysts) No. 8, at 994 (Aug. 25, 2003).
47. ThirdPiece, supra note 33, at 8-6; see Bernard Green, What Isa PensionEquity Plan?
at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20031016arOlpl.htm (Oct. 29, 2003).
48. Green, supra note 47.
49. Zelinsky, Cash Balance, supra note 4, at 694. Employees' final average earnings are
generally defined as their highest annual salary, usually over the last three or five years before
termination of employment. Green, supra note 47. Like defined benefit plans, pension equity
plans define the benefit in terms of employees' final average pay. Third Piece,supra note 33,
at 8-4. Consequently, pension equity plans provide more valuable benefits during the final years
of employees' careers, thus providing the greatest benefits to older, longer-service employees.
Id.
50. ThirdPiece, supranote 33, at 8-5; Green, supranote 47. If the plan defines the annual
credits in terms of employees' ages, then for example, a thirty-year-old to thirty-five-year-old
may accumulate 3.0 credits annually, a thirty-six-year-old to forty-year-old may accumulate 4.0
credits annually, a forty-one-year-old to forty-five-year-old may accumulate 5.0 credits annually,
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employees' hypothetical accounts each year until termination of
employment, and at that time, the total percentage is multiplied by
employees' final average earnings.5 The result is a lump-sum benefit,
52
which can be converted into an annuity if the employee so chooses.
Because the benefit is normally expressed as a lump sum, "from an age
discrimination perspective, pension equity plans are virtually identical to
cash balance plans."5 3 While most of the authority cited below demonstrates
that cash balance pension plans are not inherently age discriminatory, the
same reasoning also indicates that pension equity plans do not inherently
discriminate on the basis of age.54
I1. Statutes and PriorCase Law
A. Defined Benefit Pension Plansand the Applicable Age Discrimination
Statutes
Federal law consists of three parallel age discrimination provisions that
govern pension plans: section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA,55 section
41 l(b)(1)(H) of the IRC,56 and section 4(i) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).57 Section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA and
section 411 (b)(1)(H) of the IRC contain identical provisions that state in
relevant part, "A defined benefit pension plan shall be treated as not

etc. Green, supra note 47. If the plan defines the annual credits in terms of employees' years
of service, then for example, an employee may accumulate 10% annually for the first ten years
of service, 20% annually for the next ten years of service, etc. Zelinsky, Cash Balance, supra
note 4, at 694.
51. Third Piece, supra note 33, at 8-5; Green, supra note 47. For example, if a pension
equity plan credits participants 10% annually and an employee retires after five years, he will
have a hypothetical account balance of 50% (10% x 5) multiplied by his final average earnings.
Zelinsky, CashBalance, supra note 4, at 694. If the employee retires after twenty years, he will
have a hypothetical account balance of 200% (10% x 20) multiplied by his final average
earnings. Id.
52. Third Piece, supra note 33, at 8-6; Green, supra note 47.
53. Brief of Amici Curiae: The American Benefits Council and the ERISA Industry
Committee: In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Remedial Relief and in Support of
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Denying Retroactive Relief at 10, Cooper
v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 99-829) at http://www.
americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/ibm anicus__brief2003.pdf(last visited June 27, 2004)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
54. Id.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(l)(H) (2000).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 41 1(b)(1)(H) (2000).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 623(i).
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satisfying the requirements of this paragraph if, under the plan, an
employee's benefit accrual is ceased, or the rate of an employee's benefit
accrual is :reduced, because of the attainment of any age."58 Similarly,
section 4(i) of the ADEA prohibits employers from establishing or
maintaining a pension plan that "requires or permits... the cessation of an
employee's benefit accrual, or the reduction of the rate of an employee's
benefit accrual because of age."59 Although the IRC, ERISA, and the ADEA
all prohibit the reduction of the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual"
based on age, none of these provisions defines the term "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual."'
These three age discrimination provisions were added to their respective
statutes as a part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
(OBRA). 6 According to the OBRA Conference Report, these three
provisions should be "interpreted in a consistent manner and [the Committee
does] not intend any differences in language in the provisions to create an
inference that a difference exists among such provisions. '"62
B. Eaton v. Onan Corp.:" Cash Balance Pension PlansAre Not
Inherently Age Discriminatory
In December 1994, the Onan Corporation converted its traditional defined
benefit plan to a cash balance pension plan retroactive to January 19 8 9 .'
Onan converted benefits accrued by participants before January 1989 into
opening hypothetical account balances and did not deprive employees of any
benefits that accrued before January 1989.65 Under Onan's cash balance
pension plan, participants' hypothetical accounts received annual "paybased credits" and annual "interest credits."'
Plaintiffs-employees sued Onan, claiming that the company's cash
balance pension plan violated the age discrimination provisions of section
204(b)(1 )(H) of ERISA and section 4(i) of the ADEA by reducing the "rate

58. 26 U.S.C. § 411 (b)(1)(H)(i); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i).

59. 29 U.S.C. § 623(i).
60. 26 U.S.C. §411 (b)(1)(H); 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (b)(1)(H); see also Forman &Nixon, supra
note 4, at 421.
61. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623,29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(a), 26 U.S.C. § 411).
62. H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868,402324.
63. 117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D, Ind. 2000).
64. Id. at 819.
65. Id.
66. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:429

of an employee's benefit accrual" in accordance with age.67 Plaintiffs
conceded that neither the pay credits nor the interest credits under the Onan
cash balance pension plan depended in any way on an employee's age.68
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contended that the law required employees' benefits
to be defined in terms of an annuity commencing at normal retirement age,
rather than in terms of current pay and interest credits.69 Plaintiffs argued
that the court should apply the definition of "accrued benefit" to the term
"rate of an employee's benefit accrual."70 Both the IRC and ERISA
explicitly define the term "accrued benefit" as an employee's benefit
expressed in the form of an annuity commencing at age sixty-five.7 When
measured in terms of an age sixty-five annuity,7 2 plaintiffs argued that "the
rate of an employee's benefit accrual" decreases with age.73
In contrast, Defendant-employer argued that the OBRA age
discrimination provisions do not apply to employees younger than age sixtyfive and that even if they did, Congress did not explicitly require, or intend,
for the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" to be measured solely in
terms of an age sixty-five annuity.7 4 Defendant asserted that the "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" could be measured in terms of the annual
change in the balance of a participant's hypothetical account.7 5 When
defined in such terms, the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" does not
decrease with age.76
Accordingly, the main issue confronting the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana in Eaton was one of statutory interpretation.7 7
The court agreed with Defendant that the age discrimination provisions of
section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA and section 4(i) of the ADEA were
ambiguous and failed to specifically define the term "rate of an employee's
67. Id. at 823. "Plaintiffs also believe [Onan's cash balance pension plan] violates the
parallel provision of the [IRC], but they realize they have no standing to enforce that provision
directly." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 824.
71. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(I) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (2000); see also Eaton,
117 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
72. An annuity is "[an obligation to pay a stated sum, usu[ally] monthly or annually, to a
stated recipient." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 88 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, an age sixty-five annuity
is an annuity that commences when the recipient reaches the age of sixty-five.
73. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
74. Id. at 824.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 823.
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benefit accrual.""8 According to the court, "When dealing with such
statutory ambiguities, the courts look for guidance from many sources,
including legislative history, the broader purposes of the legislation at issue,
including evidence of the limitations and compromises made in Congress,
as well as common sense and the practical limitations of the alternative
interpretations. 79 When courts interpret an ambiguous statute, conference
reports are considered the most persuasive indication of congressional
intent. ° According to Judge Hamilton, who authored the Eaton opinion,
"The [OBRA] Conference Report shows that Congress was addressing [the]
issue of pension benefits of employees who continued working after they
reached the age of 65.""8I In addition to conference reports, courts also
consider the statements of legislators who sponsored the statute persuasive
in determining congressional intent.8 2 When Senator Grassley, one of the
sponsors of OBRA, first introduced the 1985 age discrimination provisions
he stated, "I am introducing legislation today that would amend the [ADEA]
and [ERISA] to require continued pension benefit accruals for workers who
work past the normal retirement age of 65.""3 Furthermore, the court stated
that the only example included in the conference report concerned the
benefit accruals of a participant working beyond age sixty-five." The
example retirement plan contained in the OBRA Conference Report
provides an annuity of $10 per month for each year of employment.85 Thus,
if a participant worked for ten years, he would be entitled to $100 per month

78. Id. at 825.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 827.
81. Id. at 828.
82. Id. at 827.
83. Id. at 828 (quoting 131 CONG. REc. 18,868 (1985)). Representative Jeffords, speaking
in support of the OBRA Conference Report, stated that "the bill before [Congress] is also a
pension bill which extends valuable pension accrual protections to older Americans who work
beyond normal retirement age." Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 32,963 (1986)). Similarly,
Representative Roukema said, "The legislation amends current law to preclude the 'attainment
of any age' as a reason for eliminating or reducing pension benefit accruals after normal
retirement age." Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 32,975 (1986)). In addition, Representative Clay
added that "these changes will assure that older Americans who work beyond normal retirement
age continue to earn pension credits." Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 32,975 (1986)). Finally,
Representative Hawkins stated that under this legislation, "[Employees] who work beyond
normal retirement age will continue earning pension credit." Id. at 828-29 (quoting 132 CONG.
REC. 32,975 (1986)).
84. Id. at 829.
85. H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868,4026;
see Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
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at retirement.86 According to the OBRA Conference Report, "The plan is
required to provide an additional benefit of $10 per month for each year of
service after age 65.87 In addition, the court recognized that the IRC's age
discrimination provision heading reads: "Continued accrual beyond normal
retirement age."8 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress intended to
apply the provisions regulating the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual"
only to those employees who choose to work past normal retirement age.8 9
Even assuming that the age discrimination provisions apply to employees
who are younger than normal retirement age, the court determined that
neither the IRC nor ERISA explicitly require the "rate of an employee's
benefit accrual" to be measured solely in terms of an age sixty-five
annuity.' According to Judge Hamilton, "The concept of the 'benefit
accrual rate' does not have a single, self-evident meaning, especially in the
complex world of pension plan regulation. The term is used and defined in
different ways and for different purposes under ERISA and the [IRC].'
The court provided several reasons for its conclusion. First, the court
determined that measuring the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" in
terms of an annuity commencing at age sixty-five would not make sense
when determining the benefits of a participant older than age sixty-five. 92
The court recognized that participants working past normal retirement age
were "at least a major focus" of these provisions. 93 In addition, the court
reasoned that the OBRA Conference Report example would no longer be
accurate because when benefits earned after age sixty-five are converted into
an age sixty-five annuity, the resulting annuity decreases as the employee's
age increases because of the time value of money.' Given that the OBRA

86. See H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4026; Eaton,
117 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
87. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 381, reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4026).
88. Id. at 826 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(1)(H) (2000)).
89. Id. at 829.
90. Id. at 829-30.
91. Id. at 830.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. "[A]n annuity of $10 per month beginning at age 65 is worth more than an annuity of
$10 per month beginning at age 66." Id. If the employee's post normal retirement annuity of $10
per month is converted into an age sixty-five annuity, then a sixty-six-year-old will only earn $8.90
per month, a sixty-seven-year-old will only earn $7.90 per month, a sixty-eight-year-old will only
earn $7.00 per month, and so on. Richard C. Shea et al., Age Discriminationin Cash Balance
Plans:Another View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763,769 (2000). Hence, the value of the annuity decreases
as the employee ages, which is the exact result Congress intended to prohibit. See id.
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Conference Report example was included to illustrate a pension plan that
complies with the age discrimination provisions, Judge Hamilton reasoned
that Plaintiffs's interpretation was incorrect because it "would transform that
example of compliance into an example of a violation."95
The court also recognized that common sense and public policy
implications may be considered when statutory language is ambiguous.96 As
a matter of public policy, "the rate of an employee's benefit accrual" may
decline provided that the decline is not tied to age.97 The rate can decline
with a participant's years of service, and employers can completely stop
future accruals by placing a cap on years of service or on a certain dollar
amount of benefits.9 8 Moreover, according to the court, Plaintiffs failed to
offer any public policy rationale that would be advanced by defining the
term "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" as an annuity commencing at
age sixty-five."
Recognizing that the results complained of by Plaintiffs were caused by
the time value of money and not age discrimination, the court explained
that: o
All other things being equal, the service credit for a younger
employee adds more to the value of an annuity payable at that
employee's normal retirement age than an identical service credit
for an older employee. The younger employee's service credit
will earn interest credits for more years than the older employee's
before each reaches the age of normal retirement. This effect is
inherent in virtually any cash balance pension plan design. 0 '
Because of the interest credit, the court reasoned that if the OBRA age
discrimination provisions require the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual"
to be measured in terms of an age sixty-five annuity, then the cash balance
pension plan design would be deemed inherently age discriminatory and

95. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
96. Id. at 831.
97. Id. at 831-32.
98. Id. at 832.
99. Id. at 831. Plaintiffs raised public policy concerns about the conversion from a
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance pension plan. Id. at 831 n.9. However,
"[i]ssues related to plan conversions... are different from plaintiffs' age discrimination claims
asserted here, which would effectively outlaw cash balance plans." Id.
100. Id. at 831,833.
101. Id. at 823.
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"hundreds of cash balance plans with millions of participants will be
declared illegal.' 2
-.
Thus, the court concluded that under a cash balance pension plan, the
"rate of an employee's benefit accrual" should be measured in terms of the
annual change in the hypothetical account balance or an annuity beginning
on a particular date.'0 3 When measured by either of these methods, Judge
Hamilton determined that Onan's cash balance pension plan did not
discriminate on the basis of age. "oAccordingly, the Eaton court held that
the cash balance plan maintained by Onan did not violate section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA or section 4(i) of the ADEA. °5
C. Additional Supportfor Cash Balance Pension Plans: Engers v. AT&T
and Campbell v. BankBoston
In Engers v. AT&T,'0 6 Plaintiffs-employees claimed that AT&T's cash
balance pension plan violated the age discrimination provisions of ERISA
and the ADEA.' °7 Until 1997, AT&T maintained a traditional defined
benefit plan that provided employees with an annuity at retirement based on
employees' years of plan participation and their average pay over a certain
period of time specified in the plan.'
In 1997, AT&T converted its
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance pension plan.,°9 AT&T's
cash balance pension plan defined each participating employee's benefit by
reference to a hypothetical account, which annually accrued a certain
percentage of the employee's salary and a certain percentage of interest."'
After determining that section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA and section 4(i) of the
ADEA were ambiguous, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey considered OBRA's legislative history and the Eaton v. Onan
decision. "' Accordingly, the court held that these provisions applied only
to employees who chose to work past the normal retirement age of sixty-five
and dismissed the Plaintiffs' age discrimination claim." 2

102. Id.
103. Id. at 832-33.
104. Id. at 833.
105. Id. at 815.
106. No. 98-3660, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10937 (D.N.J. June 29, 2000).
107. Id.at *3.
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id.
110. ld.
111. Engers v. AT&T, No. 98-3660, at 8 (D.N.J. June 6, 2001) (unreported letter op.) (on
file with author).
112. Id. at 10-11.
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In Campbell v. BankBoston,"3 a former employee argued that
BankBoston's cash balance pension plan violated the age discrimination
provision of ERISA." 4 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit refused to decide this issue because it was not initially raised in
district court." 5 The appellate court, however, discussed the issue in dicta
6
by essentially reiterating the holding in Eaton." The court stated that
section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA only applies to employees older than normal
7 In
retirement age, as evidenced by this section's legislative history."
addition, the court indicated that even if this provision applied to employees
younger than normal retirement age, ERISA does not require that the "rate
of an employee's benefit accrual" be measured solely in terms of an age
sixty-five annuity." 8
D. The IRS and the Treasury DepartmentSupport the Cash Balance
Pension Plan Design: Notice 96-8, the Preamble to the 1991
NondiscriminationRegulations, and the 2002 ProposedTreasury
Regulations
The IRS and the Treasury Department retain primary jurisdiction over the
implementation of regulations relating to the age discrimination provisions
of the IRC and ERISA. "9 On several occasions, the IRS has concluded that
cash balance pension plans are not inherently age discriminatory.
In 1996, the IRS published Notice 96-8,20 which provides guidance to
2
cash balance pension plan sponsors regarding interest credits. ' By issuing
Notice 96-8, the IRS indicated its support for cash balance pension plans and
implicitly concluded that cash balance pension plans do not violate the age
22 Notice 96-8 states that only frontdiscrimination provisions of the IRC.
23
loaded interest credit plans comply with the IRC. Under frontloaded cash

113. 327 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).
114. Id. at9.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978,43 Fed. Reg. 47,713, 47,713 (Aug. 10, 1978); see
H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 4025 ("The
conference agreement authorizes the Treasury to issue regulations coordinating the continuing
benefit accrual requirements with other requirements, including... the [ADEA].").
120. 1996-1 C.B. 359.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 360-61. Notice 96-8 states that a cash balance pension plan with backloaded
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balance pension plans, future interest credits are not conditioned on future
service. 14 Accordingly, if employees terminate employment before normal
retirement age and elect to defer receipt of their retirement benefits until that
time, their hypothetical accounts must continue to accrue interest credits.125
Consequently, when determining whether a cash balance pension plan
complies with the IRC's requirements, "[tihe benefits attributable to future
interest credits with respect to a hypothetical allocation accrue at the same
time that the benefits attributable to the hypothetical allocation accrue."' 126
In other words, when an employee receives a certain pay credit, all of the
interest that will accrue on that particular pay credit up until the employee
reaches normal retirement age must be taken into account at the time that the
pay credit is earned in determining the balance of the employee's
hypothetical account.'2 7 The effect of frontloaded interest "is the very
feature that attracts the age discrimination argument.' ' 28 Under a
frontloaded cash balance plan, younger employees receive higher age sixtyfive annuities than older employees because younger employees will accrue
interest credits over a longer period of time. 29
' Therefore, by issuing Notice
96-8, the IRS concluded that cash balance pension plans do not violate the
age discrimination provisions of the IRC.
The IRS had previously determined that cash balance pension plans
comply with the age discrimination requirements of the IRC through
regulations issued in 1991. The preamble to the 1991 nondiscrimination
regulations 30 states, "The fact that interest adjustments through normal
retirement age are accrued in the year of the related hypothetical allocation
will not cause a cash balance pension plan to fail to satisfy the [age

interest credits would not comply with the anti-backloading rules of section 411 (b) of the IRC.
Id. Backloaded interest credit plans condition future interest credits upon future service. Id.
at 360. Accordingly, interest is not earned until it is credited to employees' hypothetical
accounts. Id. at 360-6 1. If each interest credit is treated as having accrued in the year in which
it is credited to employees' accounts, then the interest credit in the last few years before
retirement would "exceed by many fold the combined pay and interest credits in the first few
years of plan participation, because of the effect of compounding interest over a long period."
Michael S. Home, ERISA Indus. Comm.,Are Cash BalancePension PlansInherently Unlawful
Underthe Age Discriminationand Employment Act?, Aug. 1, 2003, at http://www.eric.org.
124. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, 360.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 321.
129. See id.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4) (1991).
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discrimination rules]."'' Although preambles to regulations carry no legal
authority, the language of this preamble clearly indicates that the IRS does
not consider cash balance pension plans inherently age discriminatory.'
In December 2002, the Treasury Department and the IRS issued proposed
regulations 33 to "provide long-needed guidance on significant questions
about cash balance plans."' 34 Although the Treasury Department and the
IRS recently withdrew these proposed regulations, their issuance continues
to demonstrate that these agencies regard cash balance pension plans as
3 5 If the
consistent with the age discrimination provisions of the IRC.
Treasury Department and the IRS had adopted these regulations, they would
have applied the age discrimination rules that pertain to defined contribution
plans to-cash balance pension plans.'36 According to the formerly proposed
regulations, "[A] participant's rate of benefit accrual for a plan year is to be
determined as the addition to the participant's hypothetical account for the
plan year.""' The future interest credits would have been disregarded in

131. Id.
132. Shea et al., supra note 94, at 779; Specialized Qualified Plans-CashBalance,Target,
Age-Weighted and Hybrids, [2001] 352 3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-I, A-49 (2001).
133. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (Dec. 11, 2002).
134. Press Release, The Office of Public Affairs, Treasury and IRS Propose Regulations for
Cash Balance Plans (Dec. 10, 2002) at http:lwww.ustreas.gov/presslreleases/po3676.htm
[hereinafter Proposed Regulations for Cash Balance Plans].
135. On June 15, 2004, the Treasury Department and the IRS withdrew the proposed
regulations "to provide Congress with an opportunity to review and consider a legislative
proposal on cash balance pension plans that was included in the Administration's Budget for
Fiscal Year 2005." Press Release, The Office of Public Affairs, Treasury and IRS Withdraw
Proposed Cash Balance Regulations (June 15, 2004) at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
js1724.htm. The proposed legislation also declares that cash balance pension plans do not
violate the OBRA age discrimination provisions "as long as they treat older workers at least as
well as younger workers." Press Release, The Office of Public Affairs, Preserving Cash Balance
Plans for Workers: Treasury Proposes Legislation to Protect Defined Benefit Plans and Ensure
Fair Treatment of Older Workers in Cash Balance Conversions (Feb. 2, 2004) at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releasesjsl 132.htm. Hence, it appears that the formerly proposed
regulations continue to demonstrate the Treasury Department's determination that cash balance
pension plans are not inherently age discriminatory.
136. Proposed Regulations for Cash Balance Plans, supra note 134.
137. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)(iii) (A), 67 Fed. Reg. 76,123 (Dec. 11, 2002). The
formerly proposed regulations would have applied the age discrimination provisions to
employees younger than normal retirement age, contrary to the determination in Eaton v. Onan,
117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (S.D. Ind. 2000), that the age discrimination provisions were enacted
to protect the benefit accruals of olderworkers. Steven Pavlick & Paul M. Hamburger, Effects
of Recently Issued Proposed IRS Regulations on the Qualificationof Cash Balance Pension
Plans, 31 TAx MGM'T COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 91, 91 n.3 (2003).
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determining the balance of an employee's hypothetical account provided that
the participant retained the right to receive future interest credits without
regard to future service."'3 Accordingly, "a cash balance plan would satisfy
the age discrimination rules if the pay credits to an employee's account are
not less than the pay credits that would be made if that same employee were
younger."'39
IV. Statement of the Case: Cooperv. IBM PersonalPension Plan
Notwithstanding the prior IRS guidance, in Cooper v. IBM Personal
Pension Plan,"4 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
concluded that IBM's cash balance pension plan, as well as its pension
equity plan, violated the age discrimination provisions of ERISA.' 4 ' Before
1995, IBM maintained a traditional defined benefit plan. IBM amended the
design of its pension plan in 1995 and again in 1999.142
In 1995, IBM implemented a pension equity plan. 43 Participants in
IBM's pension equity plan accumulated benefits in the form of "base points"
and "excess points."' 44 For each year of service, employees received a
138. Alvin D. Lurie, Murphy'sLaw HasIBM Singing the Blues, at http://www.benefitslink.
com/articles/lurie20030924.pdf (Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Lurie, Murphy's Law].
139. Proposed Regulations for Cash Balance Plans, supra note 134. The formerly proposed
regulations would have only applied to "eligible cash balance plans." Treasury,IRS Issue LongAnticipated Proposed Cash Balance Guidance, DELOrrITE'S WASH.BULL.(Dec. 16, 2002) at
http://www.benefitslink.com/articles/washbullO21216.shtml. To qualify as an "eligible cash
balance plan," the plan must satisfy each of the following: (1) the normal form of the benefit
must be stated as the balance of the hypothetical account, and (2) as a participant accrues pay
credits, the participant must also accrue the right to all future interest payments that will accrue
on that pay credit. Id. Pension equity plans do not satisfy the definition of "eligible cash
balance plans." Pavlick & Hamburger, supra note 137, at 92. Therefore, pension equity plans
would not have been protected if the Treasury Department had adopted the proposed
regulations. See id.
140. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
141. Id. at 1017, 1022.
142. Id. at 1012.
143. Id. According to IBM, the company changed its plan design in 1995 to better address
its current business needs. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's §
204(b)(l)(H) Claim with Respect to IBM's Pension Credit Formula at 3, Cooper v. IBM Pers.
Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. I11.
2003) (No. 99-829) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Defendants' Motion]. Before 1995, IBM maintained a traditional defined benefit
plan that was most advantageous to employees who had worked for IBM throughout their entire
careers. Defendants' Motion, supra, at 3; see Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. As an
increasing number of employees began changing jobs mid-career, IBM saw the need for a new
pension plan design. Defendants' Motion, supra, at 3.
144. Id.
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certain number of base points, depending on their current age, and a certain
number of excess points if their earnings 45 exceeded their social security
compensation.' 46 Both base points and excess points were capped at 425
points and 75 points respectively.'4 7 Each year, base points were multiplied
by employees' earnings, and any excess points earned were multiplied by the
amount that the earnings exceeded the social security compensation.' 48
These two numbers were then added together and divided by 100 to obtain
a dollar amount known as the Pension Credit Value, which represented the
total amount of benefits earned by the employee. 49 To convert the total
value of employees' benefits into an annuity, the Pension Credit Value was
50
divided by a Benefit Conversion Factor, which was specified in the plan. 1
Participants in IBM's pension equity plan had the option of taking their
annuity immediately upon termination of employment or deferring the
annuity until a date as late as normal retirement age. 5 '
In 1999, IBM converted its pension equity plan to a cash balance pension
plan. 152 Under IBM's cash balance pension plan, a hypothetical account was
used to determine a participant's benefit. 53 Each employee's hypothetical
account accumulated monthly "pay credits" and "interest credits."'" Under
IBM's cash balance pension plan, pay credits equaled five percent of the
employee's salary, and interest credits were one percentage point higher

145. An employee's earnings were equal to the "average of the employee's highest
consecutive five year earnings" at the time of termination. Id. at 1014.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1012.
148. Id. at 1014; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 5.
149. Cooper,274 F. Supp. 2d at 1014; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 5.
150. Cooper,274 F. Supp. 2d at 1014; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 5. For
example, if an employee began working for IBM at age twenty-nine, he would earn seven base
points and zero excess points under IBM's pension equity plan for his first year of service. See
Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. Over the next five years, the employee would earn nine base
points per year and one excess point per year (assuming his average consecutive five-year
earnings exceeded the social security compensation). See id. Upon retirement, the employee
would have accumulated fifty-seven points. See id. Assuming that the employee's highest
average consecutive five-year earnings equaled $50,000, the employee's Pension Credit Value
would equal $28,500 ($50,000 x 57/100). See id. at 1014. The corresponding annuity would
equal $28,500 divided by the Benefit Conversion Factor specified in the plan. See id.
151. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1013; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 4.
152. Cooper,274 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13. According to the court, IBM amended its pension
plan design in 1999 to save money. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. In fact, the court
determined that IBM's conversion to a cash balance pension plan would save the company $500
million. Id.
153. Id. at 1013.
154. Id.
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than the present rate of return on a one-year treasury bond.'55 Upon
termination of their employment, employees could either withdraw the
money from their hypothetical account or defer the receipt of these funds
until a later date. 5 6 Former employees could continue to earn interest57
credits until they withdrew the money from their hypothetical accounts.
Upon withdrawal, employees could receive the balance from their
hypothetical accounts in the form of a lump sum or convert the balance into

a life annuity.' 58
Plaintiffs claimed that both the 1995 and the 1999 pension plan
amendments violated the age discrimination provisions of ERISA.' 5 9
Plaintiffs argued that IBM's pension equity plan violated section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA because the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual,"
when expressed in terms of an age sixty-five annuity, decreased with age. "
Plaintiffs further asserted that under IBM's pension equity plan, the Benefit
Conversion Factor for an annuity commencing at age sixty-five increased
with age, causing the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" to decline with
age. 6' Because the Pension Credit Value was divided by the Benefit
Conversion Factor,'62 Plaintiffs contended that an increasing Benefit
Conversion Factor would cause an older employee to receive a lower age
sixty-five annuity when compared to a younger employee - even when both

155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1012. In addition to the age discrimination claim under section 204(B)(1)(H) of
ERISA, Plaintiffs asserted two additional claims against IBM's pension equity plan. Id. at 1014,
1017. First, Plaintiffs claimed that IBM's pension equity plan violated section 204(b)(1)(G) of
ERISA, which prohibits an employer from reducing the amount of employees' already accrued
benefits. Id. at 1014. Second, Plaintiffs claimed that BM's pension equity plan violated
ERISA's anti-backloading rules. Id. at 1017. Backloading is regulated by section 411 (b) of the
IRC, 26 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2000), and section 204(b) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (2000).
The anti-backloading rules prohibit a pension plan from delaying the earning of employees'
future benefits until the very end of their careers. Rosina B. Barker & Kevin P. O'Brien, Berger
v. Xerox: Looking for the Law in all the Wrong Places, 16 BENEFITS LAW J. 5, 10 (2003).
Although there are three alternative rules applicable to the accrual of benefits and backloading,
most cash balance pension plans are designed to satisfy the "133 percent rule." Id. This rule
requires that "the rate of benefit accrual in any future year, measured as the age 65 benefit stated
as a percentage of pay, not exceed the rate in the current year (or any year in between) by more
than 33 percent." Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B).
160. Cooper,274 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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employees worked for the same number of years and made an identical
salary.

63

Defendants, IBM Personal Pension Plan and IBM Corporation, argued
that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on the grounds that section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA applies only to employees who have reached normal
retirement age."
Contrary to Plaintiffs' interpretation of section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA, Defendants also contended that the term "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" does not mean the same thing as "accrued
benefit" and does not require benefits to be expressed in terms of an age
sixty-five annuity. 165 When measured in terms of an age sixty-five annuity,
Defendants asserted that the time value of money, as opposed to age
discrimination, causes the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" to decline
with age. 166 According to Defendants,

[I]t is economically nonsensical to compare a 25 year old
employee's rate of benefit accrual with a 64 year old employee's
rate of benefit accrual by reference to the age 65 benefit that each
has accumulated, because the 64 year old employee is set to
67
receive his benefit much sooner.
For that reason, Defendants argued that the "rate of an employee's benefit
accrual" should be measured in terms of "benefits payable immediately upon
termination of employment." 168
According to the Cooper court, ERISA creates standing to all plan
participants, such as Plaintiffs, "who seek to protect their employee benefit
rights."' 169 Thus, the court was required to determine the meaning of the term
"rate of an employee's benefit accrual."' 170 Even though ERISA does riot
explicitly define this term, the court decided that its meaning must be
synonymous with the term "accrued benefit," which is defined in section
203(a) of ERISA as a benefit expressed in terms of an annuity commencing
at normal retirement. 171

In analyzing IBM' s pension equity plan, Judge Murphy, who authored the
Cooper opinion, recognized that employees' benefits expressed in the form
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1016.
See id.
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of an age sixty-five annuity decrease as employees approach normal
retirement age because of the time value of money.' 72 He reasoned, "From
an economist's perspective, Defendants have a good argument. A dollar
today is worth more than the promise of a dollar a year from now. This does
not mean, however, that [IBM's pension equity plan] is legal."'' 73 Judge
Murphy determined that Congress chose to use the terms "accrued benefit"
and "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" interchangeably because the
term "accrued benefit" would not have been grammatically correct if used
in section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA. 74 Judge Murphy illustrated this point by
using an analogy based on the word popcorn. "Popcorn is the word used to
describe the product created by exposing corn kernels to extreme heat. If
asked to draft a phrase related to the speed of this process, one would not say
'rate of popcorn.' Rather, to be grammatically correct, one would say 'the
rate corn pops."" 75 Because Judge Murphy determined that the terms "rate
of an employee's benefit accrual" and "accrued benefit" have identical
meanings, the court held that IBM's pension equity plan violated section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA.'7 6

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1016 n.2.
176. Id. at 1017. In addition, the court held that IBM's pension equity plan violated section
204(b)(1)(G) of ERISA because employees' already accrued benefits declined with age. Id. at
1014. A pension plan violates section 204(b)(1)(G) "if the participant's accrued benefit is
reduced on account of any increase in his age or service." 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(G) (2000).
Using an example, the court determined that as employees aged, the Benefit Conversion Factor
increased, which caused a reduction in their accrued benefit. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because none of the participants
actually had their benefit reduced because of age or service. Id. at 1014. The language of
section 204(b)(1)(G) of ERISA seems to validate Defendants' argument by requiring an actual
reduction in the amount of the accrued benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(G) (stating "if the
participant's accrued benefit is reduced on account of his increase in age or service") (emphasis
added); see IBM's Cash Balance andPension Equity Formulas Violate ERISA, District Court
Rules, DELorrrE's WASH. BULL. (Aug. 4, 2003) at http://www.benefitslink.com/articles/
washbull030804.htmil [hereinafter Deloitte, IBM's Cash Balance]. According to the court,
however, the fact that none of the employees actually received a reduction in their accrued
benefits may affect the amount of damages awarded but will not relieve Defendants of liability
under ERISA. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
The court also held that facts unique to IBM's pension equity plan caused it to violate the
anti-backloading rules of subsections 204(B)(1)(A), (B), & (C) of ERISA. Id. at 1017. The
court held that IBM's pension equity plan violated all three of the anti-backloading tests. Id.
at 1020.
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Using the same reasoning applied to IBM's pension equity plan, the court
held that IBM's cash balance formula also violated the prohibition against
age discrimination under section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA.' 77 According to
Judge Murphy, the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" under a cash
balance plan must be determined by converting the pay credits and interest
credits into an age sixty-five annuity to determine whether the plan complies
with ERISA' s requirements.7 8 The court determined that, when the benefits
of a younger employee and an older employee are compared in terms of an
age sixty-five annuity, the interest credits for the younger employee would
always be worth more than the interest credits for the older employee.17 9
Therefore, the court held that under IBM's cash balance plan, the "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" declined with age in violation of section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA.8 0

177. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22.
178. Id. at 1021.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1022. In past cases, plan participants have also asserted disparate impact claims
against employers who have converted their traditional defined benefit formula to a cash balance
formula. Some of the Plaintiffs in Cooper may have had a possible disparate impact claim
against IBM.
In Godinez v. CBS, 81 Fed. Appx. 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Godinez 1],
Plaintiffs claimed that they were disproportionately deprived of pension benefits based on their
age when CBS Corp. replaced their traditional defined benefit plan with a cash balance pension
plan, in violation of ERISA and the ADEA. Godinez v. CBS, No. CV-0l -28-GLT, 2002 WL
32155542 at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 20,2002), aff'd, 81 Fed. Appx. 949 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Godinez II]. To prove disparate impact, "an employee bears the burden of showing a facially
neutral employment practice had a discriminatory impact on older workers." Id.; see also
Howard Shapiro & Robert Rachal, Litigation Issues in Cash Balance Plans (1999), at
http://www.benefitslink.comlarticles/cashbalance.shtml (last visited June 30,2004). Under the
CBS cash balance pension plan, the employees closest to retirement continued to accrue benefits
pursuant to CBS's traditional defined benefit plan, as opposed to its cash balance pension plan.
Godinez II, 2002 WL 32155542 at *1. The pension formula for the youngest employees (age
forty-one or younger) was converted to the cash balance formula, which provided an annual
benefit equal to 2% of the employee's yearly salary. Id. Plaintiffs were members of the middle
group of employees, whose pension formulas were converted to the cash balance formula. Id.
In addition to receiving annual pay credits equal to 2% of their salary, Plaintiffs received
Transition Pay Credits ranging from 0.5% to 6.5% of annual eligible pay. Id. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California's decision that Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence showing any disparate impact on
older employees. Godinez 1, 81 Fed. Appx. at 949. In fact, according to the district court, the
CBS pension plan actually treated Plaintiffs better than similarly situated younger employees
given that Plaintiffs received transition pay credits based on annual eligible pay that increased
yearly. Godinez II, 2002 WL 32155542 at *2.
The facts of the IBM case, however, differed significantly from those of the CBS case.
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V. Analysis: IBM's Cash Balance Pension Plan and Pension Equity Plan
Did Not Discriminateon the Basis of Age
A. The Effect Complained of by the Cooper PlaintiffsResulted From the
Time Value of Money, Not Age Discrimination
Section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA, section 411(b)(1)(H) of the IRC, and
section 4(i) of the ADEA do not protect against all instances in which an older
employee receives a smaller benefit than a younger employee; 8 ' rather, they
only protect against those instances resulting "because of the attainment of
any age."'' 1 2 In other words, the age discrimination provisions only prohibit
a decline in the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" if it is directly caused
by an employee's attainment of a certain age.' 83 The interest credit, in the
case of IBM's cash balance pension plan, and the increasing Benefit
Conversion Factor, in the case of IBM's pension equity plan, caused the
Neither the interest credit nor the Benefit
alleged age discrimination.'
Conversion Factor, however, favored the younger workers over the older
workers. Instead, both of these features merely protected against inflation,
which causes employees' benefits to become less valuable over time.'8 5 if
these features were not part of IBM' s pension plans, the younger employees

When IBM converted its pension equity plan to a cash balance pension plan in 1999, it did not
allow many employees to choose between the previous formula and the cash balance formula.
See Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. It also appears that BM failed to provide any transition
credits to decrease the adverse effect on older workers. See id. As a result of negative reaction
from employees, IBM amended its cash balance pension plan in September 1999 to allow
additional older employees to choose between the old formula and the cash balance formula.
Id. Thus, if those employees who were not allowed to remain under the old formula had
claimed that the conversion to the cash balance formula caused a disparate impact on them
because of their age, they may have had a cause of action against BM under a disparate impact
theory.
181. See Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 304.
182. 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000).
183. See Lurie, Age Discrmination,supra note 32, at 304.
184. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13. The problems associated with cash balance
pension plans reflect the difficulty of applying rules to cash balance pension plans that were
developed for traditional defined benefit plans. Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supra note
3, at 13-65. "Many of the basic ERISA concepts... work adequately for traditional defined
benefit plans, but fail miserably when confronted with non-traditional plans like cash balance
plans." Id. at 13-56.
185. See Shea et al., supra note 94, at 775.
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would be at a severe disadvantage because their benefits would decline8 in
6
value over a longer time period than the benefits of the older employees.' 1
Clearly, $1000 today is worth more than $1000 twenty years from now
because inflation causes the value of money to decline over time.' 87 Assuming
everything else is equal, it is clearly not age discrimination for a fifty-year-old
and a sixty-year-old to each receive $1000 today.'8 8 Under a cash balance
pension plan, however, for both employees to receive $1000 in present value
terms, interest must be added to both of their account balances annually until
they receive the pension benefit.8 9 Assuming the retirement date under the
plan is age sixty-five, a fifty-year-old who works until age sixty-five earns
interest on the $1000 for fifteen years, while the sixty-year-old who works
until age sixty-five only earns interest for five years. "9 If both the fifty-yearold and the sixty-year-old receive fifteen years worth of interest on the $1000,
they would not receive equal benefits.' 9 ' The sixty-year-old would receive
greater benefits,'92 and ERISA, in particular, does not require pension plans
to favor older employees - it merely requires equality among employees of
all ages.' 93
By issuing Notice 96-81' and the 1991 nondiscrimination regulations,195 the
IRS and the Treasury Department determined that the correlation between age
and the effects of compounding interest does not constitute age
discrimination. 196 Indeed, Notice 96-8 requirescash balance pension plans to
provide frontloaded interest credits under which all interest that will accrue
on a pay credit until normal retirement age must be taken into account at the
time the pay credit is earned. 97 This IRS requirement, which causes younger
employees to receive higher age sixty-five annuities than older employees, 98

186. See Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 303; Defendants' Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law with Respect to Plaintiffs' Age Discrimination Claims at 5,
Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 99-829).
187. See Lurie, Age Discrimination,supranote 32, at 303; Shea et al., supra note 94, at 775.
188. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 303.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Lunn v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 166 F.3d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1999).
194. 1996-1 C.B. 359.
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4) (1991).
196. See Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 321-22; supra Part III.D.
197. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, 360.
198. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 320-21. This IRS requirement causes
younger employees to receive higher age sixty-five annuities than older employees because
younger employees receive interest credits over more years than older employees.
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is directly contrary to Judge Murphy's analysis. Also, in Hazen PaperCo. v.
Biggins,'99 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a pension plan under
which the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" is based on a reasonable
factor other than employees' ages will not constitute age discrimination even
if the factor strongly correlates with age. 2" Given that the "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" under IBM's pension plans declined because of
the effects of compounding interest, the Cooper court should not have
concluded that these pension plans discriminated on the basis of age.20
1. IBM's Cash Balance Pension Plan Did Not Discriminateon the Basis
ofAge
[BM's cash balance formula treated all similarly situated employees the
same, regardless of their respective ages. Each year, employees accrued pay
credits equal to five percent of their salary and interest credits at one
percentage point higher than the rate of return on one-year Treasury
Securities.20 2 Hence, under the IBM cash balance pension plan, employees of
any age with identical salaries accrued identical benefits, regardless of the
difference in their respective ages. 20 3 Because age was never taken into
account in determining the value of employees' benefits, it is difficult to
conclude that IBM's cash balance pension plan discriminated on the basis of
age.
2. IBM's Pension Equity Plan Did Not Discriminateon the Basis ofAge
Under IBM's pension equity plan, the base points and excess points earned
each year were determined according to employees' ages and earnings.2 4 In
actuality, the pension equity plan favored older employees over their younger
counterparts because older employees received more points per year of service
than younger employees. 20 5 For example, a thirty-five-year-old employee
earned twelve base points and two excess points per year of service, while a
forty-five-year-old employee earned sixteen base points and three excess
points per year of service. 2°6
199. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
200. Id. at611.
201. See Fourth Piece,supranote 4, at 9-11 (noting that interest credits protect cash balance
pension plans from inflation and such inflation protectors have never been considered age
discriminatory); Shea et al., supra note 94, at 774; Shapiro & Rachal, supra note 180.
202. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
203. See Shapiro & Rachal, supra note 180.
204. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
205. Id. at 1023; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 4.
206. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-24; see Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 4.
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Furthermore, the Benefit Conversion Factor increased with age only when
the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" was expressed in the form of an
age sixty-five annuity. Because the Pension Credit Value was divided by the
Benefit Conversion Factor, an increasing Benefit Conversion Factor caused
an older employee to receive a lower age sixty-five annuity when compared
to a younger employee with an identical salary and the same number of years
of service. Even Judge Murphy recognized that under IBM's pension equity
plan, "the rate of accrual of an employee's immediately-payable benefit
steadily increases with age."20 7 When employees' benefits were expressed in
the form of an annuity taken immediately upon termination of employment,
the Benefit Conversion Factor actually decreased with age,20" thus causing the
"rate of an employee's benefit accrual" to increase with age.2" 9 Therefore,
because "the rate of an employee's benefit accrual" did not decrease in
accordance with age, IBM's pension equity plan did not discriminate on the
basis of age.
B. ERISA, the IRC, and the ADEA Do Not Define the Phrase "Rate of an
Employee's Benefit Accrual" and None of These Statutes Supports the
Strict InterpretationApplied by the Cooper Court
ERISA, the IRC, and the ADEA do not explicitly state whether the "rate of
an employee's benefit accrual" must be measured in terms of an age sixty-five
annuity as opposed to being measured by reference to other terms, such as the
annual change in the balance of an employee's hypothetical account. Even
Judge Murphy acknowledged that "ERISA does not explicitly answer this
question."2 1 Because Judge Murphy found section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA
ambiguous, the legislative history of this statutory provision should have been
examined to determine whether Congress intended to use the terms "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" and "accrued benefit" synonymously. 2" Judge

In addition, according to Defendants' brief, the excess point calculation was also advantageous
to older workers because social security compensation is lower for older employees.
Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 5. Thus, the difference between employees' earnings
and the social security compensation would have been greater for older employees. Id.
Consequently, "each excess point [would] produce more dollars of Pension Credit Value for an
older employee than for a younger employee if both [had] the same [e]arnings." Id.
207. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016 (emphasis omitted).

208. Defendants' Motion, supra note 143, at 5.
209. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
210. Id.
211. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (stating that courts must look to legislative
history to determine the meaning of a statute when statutory language is ambiguous); Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("Where, as here, resolution of a question of federal law
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Murphy, however, not only failed to analyze the legislative history of the
OBRA age discrimination provisions, he completely ignoredthe legislative
history in reaching his conclusion. He also failed to consider the Eaton v.
Onan decision, in which Judge Hamilton, after providing a detailed opinion
outlining the legislative history of the OBRA age discrimination provisions,
correctly concluded that cash balance pension plans are not inherently age
discriminatory." 2 In fact, Judge Murphy mentioned neither the prior cases in
which cash balance pension plans were found to be consistent with the
statutory requirements mandated by the OBRA age discrimination provisions,
nor any of the guidance issued by the IRS demonstrating its support of the
cash balance design. 2 3 By combining several ERISA sections in a highly
questionable fashion, Judge Murphy construed "accrued benefit" and "rate of
an employee's benefit accrual" as synonymous.2 14 Judge Murphy also
contradicted his earlier finding that "ERISA does not explicitly answer this
question,"2 5 by concluding that the language of section 204(b)(1)(H) of
ERISA was "literal and unambiguous. ' ' 216
Contrary to Judge Hamilton's analysis in Eaton,Judge Murphy determined
that Congress chose to include in ERISA two different terms with the same
'
meaning "to be grammatically correct." 217
After accurately acknowledging
that Defendants had a good argument "[flrom an economist's perspective,"
and recognizing that the effect complained of by Plaintiffs resulted from the
time value of money, Judge Murphy erroneously concluded that Congress
chose grammar over sound economical logic. 2 18 If Congress had intended for
the definition of "accrued benefit" to apply to section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA,
Congress would have worded this section in a grammatically correct way that
turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then
to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear."); Eaton v. Onan, 117 F. Supp. 2d
812, 825 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("When dealing with such statutory ambiguities, the courts look for
guidance from many sources, including legislative history .....
212. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 825-30.
213. See generallyCooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
Ironically, after the court declared BM's cash balance pension plan age discriminatory, Judge
Murphy stated, "IBM, like many other corporate plan sponsors, proceeded with open eyes and
was fully informed of the consequences of the litigation that was sure to come." Id. at 1022.
In light of the previous guidance by the IRS, Treasury Department, and other courts, however,
it is difficult to perceive how IBM could have reasonably believed their cash balance pension
plan would be declared illegal. Lurie, Murphy's Law, supra note 138.
214. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; see also Lurie, Murphy's Law, supra note 138.
215. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
216. Id.at 1022.
217. Id.at 1016.
218. Id.
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included the term "accrued benefit" instead of the term "rate of an employee's
benefit accrual." For example, Congress could have worded section
204(b)(1)(H) as follows: A defined benefit plan will not comply with this
provision if the annual change in an employee's "accrued benefit" declines
because of the attainment of any age. Or, Congress could have simply defined
the term "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" or indicated its intention to
use this term interchangeably with the term "accrued benefit." Contrary to
Judge- Murphy's analysis in Cooper, Judge Hamilton determined that
Congress did not intend for the two terms to be used synonymously. He
concluded, "The argument distinguishing between 'accrued benefit' . . . and
'rate of benefit accrual' may seem like pretty fine hair-splitting. Nevertheless,
is a highly technical field where hairs are split with ever finer
pension law
219
razors."
As accurately described by the Eaton court, the legislative history of OBRA
clearly demonstrates that the age discrimination provisions of the IRC,
ERISA, and the ADEA were not intended to apply to employees younger than
normal retirement age.22 In determining congressional intent for enacting a
statute, the conference reports are the most persuasive indicator. 22' The

219. Eaton v. Onan, 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 830 n.8 (S.D. Ind.2000). Also, assuming the age
discrimination provisions define the term "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" as an age
sixty-five annuity, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that courts should look to the purpose of
a statute if the facial meaning produces absurd results, even if the statute appears unambiguous
on its face. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424,449 (2002)
("A statute should not be interpreted to produce absurd results."); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) ("Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable
distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible."); United States v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("When [the plain meaning of the statute] has led to absurd
or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.");
see also Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 316; Lurie, Murphy's Law, supra note
138. Even Judge Murphy recognized that the court's interpretation of the age discrimination
statute creates "startling anomalies and absurdities." Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1020; see
supra Part V.A; infra Part V.D.
220. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829; Rosina B. Barker & Kevin O'Brien, Cash Balance
Conversions Under the ADEA-Reconsidered and Reaffirmed, 15 BENEFITS LAW J. 1, 13-14
(2002); Shea et al., supra note 94, at 768. In addition, the only other courts that have
considered this issue have determined that the OBRA age discrimination provisions were not
intended to apply to employees younger than normal retirement age. Campbell v. BankBoston,
327 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003); Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88, 92-93 (D. Md. 2004);
Engers v. AT&T, No. 98-CV-3660, 2002 WL 32159586, at *26-27 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2002);
Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
221. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("In surveying legislative history we
have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the
Committee Reports on the bill."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421 (7th
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OBRA Conference Report explicitly demonstrates that Congress enacted the
OBRA age discrimination provisions to ensure that employees choosing to
work past normal retirement age continued to earn retirement benefits.222 It
states that the age discrimination provisions are "not intended to, apply to
cases in which a plan satisfies the normal benefit accrual requirements for
employees who have not attained normal retirement age. '223 Also, the OBRA
Conference Report explains that employees' benefit accruals under any
pension plan "may not be reduced or discounted on account of the attainment
of a specified age."224 Before the enactment of the OBRA age discrimination
provisions, traditional defined benefit plans "typically stated that an employee
was entitled to an accrued benefit equal to a fixed percentage of pay times
years of service before age sixty-five and no benefit attributable to years of
service after age sixty-five. '225 Therefore, by enacting OBRA, Congress
apparently intended to prohibit defined benefit plans from specifying that an
employee's benefit accrual would cease to accrue or would begin to accrue at
a lower rate once the employee reached normal retirement age.226 In addition,
the plain language of section 411 (b)(1-)(H) of the IRC and section
204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA supports the proposition that Congress only sought to
prohibit accruals from ceasing, or being reduced, at a specified age once the
employee reached normal retirement age.227

Cir. 1993) (stating that the conference report is "the most persuasive evidence of congressional
intent besides the statute itself'); Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 827 ("When the text of a statute is
ambiguous, the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides the statute itself is the
conference report.").
222. H.R. REP. No.99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868,4024;
see Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829; Shea et al., supra note 94, at 768; Simplifying Defined
Benefit Plans,supra note 3, at 13-68.
223. H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4024.
224. H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4023 (emphasis
added).
225. Shea et al., supra note 94, at 773; see Lunn v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 166 F.3d 880,
883 (1999) (recognizing that Montgomery Ward could not say to Lunn, "[I]f you insist on
working after you reach the age of 65, [we are] going to cut down your normal retirement
benefits").
226. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 829; Shea et al., supra note 94, at 773; Simplifying Defined
Benefit Plans, supra note 3, at 13-68; see supra Part III.B (explaining the legislative history of
the OBRA age discrimination provisions).
227. The plain language of section 41 l(b)(l)(H) of the IRC and section 204(b)(1)(H) of
ERISA prohibits the reduction of "the rate of an employee's benefit accrual... because of the
attainment of any age." 26 U.S.C. § 41 l(b)(l)(H)(i) (2000) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss2/8

20041

NOTES

Even if Congress intended for these age discrimination provisions to apply
to employees younger than normal retirement age, the term "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" does not necessarily have the same meaning as
the term "accrued benefit. ' 228 If the annual benefit accrual must be converted
to an age sixty-five annuity to test for age discrimination, an employee's
benefit accrual for each year after normal retirement would appear to decline
with age.229 In fact, most traditional defined benefit plans would fail this
test.23 Furthermore, if Judge Murphy's definition of the term "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" were applied, the example of the pension plan
provided in the OBRA Conference Report that complied with the age
discrimination provisions231 would be deemed illegal - a result Congress
could not have intended.23 2
C. Public Policy Does Not Favor the Cooper Court's Interpretationof the
Age DiscriminationProvisionsof ERISA
Public policy supports the continued existence of cash balance pension
plans for various reasons. First, many employees find cash balance pension
plans easier to understand than traditional defined benefit plans because the
233
benefit is expressed in the form of an account balance. In addition, mobile
employees, who may not desire to perform services for the same company
during their entire careers, are able to change jobs mid-career without
foregoing the large benefits that accrue at the end of employees' careers under
traditional defined benefit plans.2M Moreover, cash balance pension plans
allow younger employees to accrue benefits earlier in their careers than under
traditional defined benefit plans23 5 because the benefits accrue more evenly
236 Even Judge Murphy
over employees' careers than under traditional plans.
228. Shea et al., supra note 94, at 768.
229. Id. at 769.
230. Id. at 770.
231. H.R. REP. No. 99-1012, at 378-79 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868,4026.
232. See Eaton v. Onan, 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 829 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Shea et al., supra note
94, at 769; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
233. Drigotas, supranote 1, at 41; Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supranote 3, at 13-54.
234. Futureof CashBalance Plans,supranote 42, at 1926. Cash balance pension plans are
valuable to women, who are more likely to move in and out of the work force to raise a family.
Lawrence J. Sher, Survey of Cash Balance Pension Plans, 17 BENEFrrs Q. 19, 23 (2001).
235. Future of Cash BalancePlans, supra note 42, at 1926.
236. Drigotas, supra note 1, at 41. In addition, some companies may convert from a
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance pension plan to save money. Forman & Nixon,
supra note 4, at 409; Patricia A. Rotello & Thomas A. Osmond, PartCash, PartBalancingAct:
Why Cash Balance Pension Plans Get So Much Attention, 14 J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 13,
13 (1999). However, it is not always cheaper for a company to convert to a cash balance
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recognized that public policy might be advanced if companies implement cash
balance pension plans.23
If the Coopercourt's interpretation of ERISA is adopted, employers will
be given an incentive not to protect employees' benefits against inflation. The
perceived age discrimination complained about by the Cooper Plaintiffs
resulted from the interest credit, in the case of IBM's cash balance pension
plan,238 and the increasing Benefit Conversion Factor, in the case of IBM's
pension equity plan, both of which protected the pension benefit from the
effects of inflation.239 Thus, "if the plan credited no interest on hypothetical
allocations, there would be no discrimination.""24 Providing employers with
an incentive not to protect the value of an employee's pension benefits is
"completely at odds with sound pension policy. ' 241
In addition, the Cooper court's interpretation of the ERISA age
discrimination provisions will cause a significant increase in expenses for
employers who maintain cash balance pension plans and pension equity
plans.2 42 Given that the U.S. pension system is "voluntary, 2 43 a significant
increase in the cost of maintaining a pension plan will likely cause many
companies to abandon their pension plans altogether, a result not supported
by public policy considerations. Companies that choose to continue to
provide their employees with a pension plan will most likely convert their
pension plans to defined contribution plans. 2" The U.S. pension system will
"almost certainly migrate to a fully defined contribution plan [and that] move
will continue the shift of the investment and saving risk to the individual. 2 45
Public policy does not favor the shift from cash balance pension plans to
defined contribution plans precisely because the pension benefits of workers

pension plan. Rotello & Osmond, supra, at 13-14.
237. Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (S.D. I11. 2003). Also,
the plaintiffs in Eaton were unable to state any policy reason that would be advanced by
measuring the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" solely in terms of an age sixty-five
annuity. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 831 n.9.
238. Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supra note 3, at 13-68.
239. Shea et al., supra note 94, at 775.
240. Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans,supra note 3, at 13-68.
241. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
242. Firm Seeks Reassuranceon Validity of Cash Balance Plan Conversions, [2000] Tax
Notes Today (Tax Analysts) 37-60 (Feb. 24, 2000). Employers would be forced to increase
each year's pay credit at the same rate as the interest credit. Id. Increasing the annual pay credit
as the employee ages, however, may cause cash balance pension plans to violate the antibackloading rules of ERISA and the IRC. Deloitte, IBM's Cash Balance, supra note 176.
243. Forman & Nixon, supra note 4, at 383.
244. See Cash Balance Guidance,PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 1, 2003, at 10.
245. Id.
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will no,longer be guaranteed by the employer. The individual employee,
many of whom have limited investment experience, will bear the risk of
investment and "[t]hose individuals are much less enthusiastic246about defined
contribution plans now than at the height of the bull market."
D. Cash Balance Pension Plans and PensionEquity Plans Should Be
Measuredfor Age DiscriminationBased on Either the Annual Change in
the HypotheticalAccount Balance or in Terms of an Annuity Commencing
on a ParticularDate
As stated above,2 47 Congress never defined the phrase "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual," which indicates that it did not intend one specific
method to be used in determining whether a pension plan complies with the
OBRA age discrimination provisions." 8 In addition, section 411 (b)(1)(H) of
the IRC and section 204(b)(1)(H) of ERISA state: "[A] defined benefit plan
shall be treated as not satisfying the requirements of this paragraph if, under
the plan, .. . the rate of an employee's benefit accrual is reduced, because of
the attainment of any age. '"249 The phrase "under the plan" implies that
Congress intended to allow the company offering the plan to choose the
testing method, thus indicating that various methods were acceptable in
proving the plan's compliance with the OBRA age discrimination
provisions.250
Cash balance pension plans and pension equity plans could reasonably be
tested for age discrimination based on the annual change in an employee's
hypothetical account balance, which is the same way defined contribution
plans 251' are tested. 25 2 Because defined contribution plans and cash balance

246. Id.
247. See supra Part V.B.
248. See Shea et al., supra note 94, at 767.
249. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
250. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 53, at 9. For example, the cash balance pension
plan at issue in Eaton defined the participant's accrued benefit as either (1) the participant's
account balance as of any particular date, or (2) the participant's account balance expressed in
the form of an annuity as of any particular date. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 820. The court
determined that both forms reasonably measured whether a cash balance pension plan complied
with the OBRA age discrimination provisions. Id. at 833.
251. Section 411(b)(2)(A) of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2)(A) (2000), prohibits defined
contribution plans from causing "the rate at which amounts are allocated to the employee's
account" from being reduced "because of the attainment of any age." Id.
252. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supranote 32, at 320; Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing
a Mistake?: Cash BalancePension Plans,New ComparabilityFormulas,and the Incoherence
of the NondiscriminationNorm, [2001] N.Y.U. Rev. of Employee Ben. & Exec. Compensation
(MB) 5-1, 5-48 (July 2001) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testinga Mistake?]. Acash balance
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plans share many similar features, a reasonable method for determining
whether the plan complies with the OBRA age discrimination provisions is to
compare the annual change in employees' hypothetical account balances.2 1
Also, the regulations issued by the Treasury Department and the IRS in 2002,
which were recently withdrawn, stated that "a participant's rate of benefit
accrual for a plan year is permitted to be determined as the addition to the
participant's hypothetical account for the plan year.' '2' Hence, the Treasury
Department supports this method of testing.255 Furthermore, the court in
Eaton v. Onan concluded that measuring the "rate of an employee's benefit
accrual" in terms of the change in an employee's hypothetical account balance
was a reasonable method for determining whether a pension plan satisfied the
OBRA age discrimination provisions.256 Additionally, since the Cooper
opinion was issued, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
determined that cash balance pension plans do not discriminate on the basis
of age and should be tested for age discrimination by measuring the change in
257
employees' hypothetical account balances over time.
pension plan could be tested for age discrimination by comparing the annual cost of the benefit.
Simplifying Defined Benefit Plans, supra note 3, at 13-68 n.210.
253. Lurie, Age Discrimination, supra note 32, at 320; Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a
Mistake?, supra note 252, at 5-48. The Treasury Department approved cross-testing, which
allows the defined contribution rules to apply to cash balance pension plans, in testing for
discrimination in favor of the highly compensated. Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)(4) (1991); see Lurie,
Age Discrimination,supra note 32, at 320. Under the same rationale, cash balance pension
plans should be cross-tested for age discrimination. Lurie, Age Discrimination,supra note 32,
at 320.
254. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (b), 67 Fed. Reg. 76,131 (Dec. 11, 2002).
255. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
256. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
257. Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88,94 (D. Md. 2004). In Tootle, Plaintiff-employee
alleged that ARINC's cash balance pension plan discriminated against employees on the basis
of age in violation of section 1054(b)(1)(H) of ERISA. Id. at 91. Before 1999, ARINC
maintained a traditional defined benefit plan that provided employees with benefits based on
their years of service and "a percentage of [their] highest three consecutive years of salary
within the ten years preceding retirement." Id. at 89-90. In January 1999, ARINC converted
its traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance pension plan. Id. at 90. ARINC's cash
balance pension plan defined each employee's benefit by reference to a hypothetical account
balance, which annually accrued a percentage of the employee's salary and an interest credit.
Id.
According to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, section 1054(b)(1)(H) of
ERISA does not apply to employees younger than normal retirement age, based on the
legislative history of this section of ERISA and the Eaton v. Onan decision. Id. at 93.
However, even if section 1054(B)(1)(H) of ERISA does apply to employees younger than
normal retirement age, the court determined that ERISA does not require that the "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" be measured in terms of an age sixty-five annuity. Id. Instead, the
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Moreover, cash balance pension plans and pension equity plans could be
tested for age discrimination by comparing annuities beginning on a particular
date.25 8 When the present balance of an employee's hypothetical account is
expressed in the form of an annuity, the value of the benefit is greater for
older employees when compared with the annuities of their younger
counterparts. 259 Also, the Eaton court agreed that expressing the "rate of an
employee's benefit accrual" in terms of an annuity beginning on any particular
date would satisfy the age discrimination rules.2"
VI. Conclusion
Cash balance pension plans, along with pension equity plans, are not
inherently age discriminatory according to the legislative history of the OBRA
age discrimination provisions, case law, and guidance from the IRS and
Treasury Department. The Cooper v. IBM PersonalPension Plan decision
defies a strong history of support for cash balance pension plans. Therefore,
other courts should not follow the Cooper decision.
Allison C. McGrath

court stated that the "rate of an employee's benefit accrual" should be measured in terms of the
change in employees' hypothetical account balances over time, as ERISA requires for defined
contribution plans. Id. Consequently, the court refused to grant the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification and dismissed the Plaintiff's cause of action for failure to state a claim under
section 1054(b)(1)(H) of ERISA. Id. at 94.
258. Id.; Shea et al., supra note 94, at 772-73 (noting that benefit accruals could be tested
for age discrimination by comparing the value of immediate annuities).
259. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 833; Shea et al., supra note 94, at 772-73.
260. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 812. In addition, according to Defendants' brief in Cooper,
cash balance pension plans and pension equity plans could reasonably be tested for age
discrimination by comparing the age sixty-five annuities of employees of different ages,
provided that the annuities are discounted to their present value. See Defendants' Motion, supra
note 143, at 10, 13. "'[Titpermit a proper comparison' of annuities payable at different points
in time, it is necessary to discount the annuities to present value." Id. at 10.
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